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Abstract
A legislature’s ability to engage in oversight of the executive is believed to derive
largely from its committee system. For example, powerful parliamentary commit-
tees are considered a necessary condition for the legislature to help police policy
compromises between parties in multiparty government. But can other parliamen-
tary instruments perform this role? This paper suggests parliamentary questions
as an alternative parliamentary vehicle for coalition parties to monitor their part-
ners. Questions force ministers to reveal information concerning their legislative and
extra-legislative activities, providing coalition members unique insights into their
partners behaviour. To test our argument, we build and analyse a new dataset
of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons covering the 2010-15
coalition. As expected, government MPs ask more questions as the divisiveness of a
policy area increases. Legislatures conventionally considered weak due to the lack of
strong committees may nevertheless play an important oversight role through other
parliamentary devices, including helping to police the implementation of coalition
agreements.
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In many parliamentary regimes, coalition governments (cabinets comprising more than
one political party) are common. Scholars have long been intrigued by which parties par-
ticipate in such governments (Müller and Strøm 2003). More recently, political scientists
have explored how coalition governments function once formed. Coalitions typically form
after interested parties bargain over and reach a coalition agreement. This agreement
must be policed because individual ministers may have an incentive to deviate from the
agreement, toward the preferences of the party to which they belong (Thies 2001).1 Po-
litical institutions provide a mechanism by which, in the parlance of agency theory, the
principal (the coalition) monitors the agent (the minister), thus ensuring the stability of
the coalition. Parliamentary committees’ engagement in the legislative process is one im-
portant means by which parties in coalition government keep tabs on each other (André
et al. 2016; Martin 2004; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Zubek 2015).
We contribute to the literature on legislatures and coalition monitoring by suggesting
that parliamentary questions (PQs) are another potential instrument for coalition parties
to monitor their partners in coalition government.2 PQs are a common feature of many
legislatures, allowing parliamentarians to formally ask questions of, and receive answers
from, members of the executive. PQs force ministers to reveal information on past,
current and future activities.
To test our proposition that parties in a coalition government use PQs to keep tabs on
each other, we build and analyse a new dataset of parliamentary questions in the British
House of Commons covering the 2010-15 coalition government. The British Parliament
is commonly seen as one of the weakest democratic national parliaments in terms of its
ability to hold the cabinet to account. The growth of the Cabinet’s legislative powers –
the efficient secret (Cox 1987) – and high levels of party voting unity (Kam 2009) means
that the executive dominates the legislative process. A weak committee system reduces
the ability of the chamber to provide oversight of the government (Norton 2013). West-
minsters committees remain the poor cousin of many European parliamentary committee
systems (Martin 2011a). As Kreppel Kreppel (2014: 95) notes in reviewing the compar-
ative literature on legislative typologies, ‘the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament
serve as the emblematic examples of a strong congress and weak parliament respectively’
although recent scholarship has challenged this view by showing how UK backbenchers
can exert influence over the government (Russell et al. 2016; Russell and Cowley 2016;
1The comparative literature on political coalitions uses various terms including ‘policing’, ‘monitoring’,
‘keeping tabs’, ‘controlling’, and ‘constraining’. We use these terms interchangeably throughout the paper
to describe the phenomenon by which parties in coalition government seek to minimise agency loss and
ensure that all members of the coalition cabinet are implementing the coalition agreement.
2Scholars have identified a number of extra-legislative mechanisms by which parties in coalition gov-
ernment can keep tabs on each other, including detailed ex ante coalition agreements (Müller and Strøm
2008), the strategic allocation of junior ministers (Thies 2001), and sharing deputy prime ministerships
among coalition parties (Saalfeld 2000). Understanding of the relative popularity of the various mecha-
nisms remains largely unexplored.
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Russell and Gover 2017). The emergence of a coalition government in the United King-
dom for the first time since 1945 provides a challenging case to study the use of legislative
tools for intra-coalition monitoring. To anticipate, we find that MPs ask more questions
of ministries held by their coalition partner as the level of policy divergence between the
coalition partners increases.
A number of important consequences flow from our argument and findings. Based
largely on the US Congressional model, comparative legislative scholars have long focused
on committee systems to measure a legislatures potential power and influence (Martin
2014). Although strong committees undoubtedly strengthen legislatures vis-à-vis the ex-
ecutive (Strøm 1990), they are perhaps not a necessary condition for oversight of the
executive by the legislature. Other legislative instruments provide alternative avenues by
which the legislature can hold ministers accountable. Thus, legislatures conventionally
considered weak due to the lack of strong committees may nevertheless play an impor-
tant oversight role (not least during times of coalition government), as we believe the
British case demonstrates. Relatedly, our arguments regarding the strategic use of PQs
shed light on the importance of monitoring extra-legislative ministerial activity. Existing
scholarship on legislatures and coalition government (discussed below) stresses the abil-
ity of legislatures to scrutinize and amend a ministers proposed legislation. Yet, much of
modern government is based on post-legislative delegation to the minister and ministries
(Huber and Shipan 2002). PQs allow parties in coalition to keep tabs on these extra-
legislative activities of ministers and their officials. The behaviour of a minister may be
different at the policy implementation stage if the partner party is not continuing to keep
tabs on the minster and her ministry. Finally, our research provides much needed insights
into how coalition government operates in what many consider an archetypical majori-
tarian political system (Lijphart 2012). Even here, parliament plays a more significant
role than heretofore acknowledged.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, we briefly review the liter-
ature on coalition delegation and oversight. Section 3 introduces our argument that PQs
are a potential vehicle to keep tabs on the activities of ministers in coalition government.
Section 4 briefly introduces the British case. Section 5 presents the data and analysis.
We conclude the paper with a review of our findings and suggestions for future research.
1 Delegation and Oversight in Coalition Government
Coalition government requires governing parties to cooperate over the production and
implementation of public policy. At the same time, potential for conflict exists because
parties in a coalition govern in the shadow of elections where they will typically compete
directly against each other for votes. Moreover, individual ministers and the parties to
which they belong usually have their own policy preferences. Coalition government is
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only possible because parties are willing to compromise on these preferences in order to
govern jointly. In many countries, a formal coalition agreement sets out the compromise
(Müller and Strøm 2008).
It falls to individual cabinet ministers to implement the coalition agreement. In the
parlance of principal-agent theory, a cabinet minister acts as the agent of the cabinet.
Ministers are particularly powerful in parliamentary regimes, effectively acting as gate-
keepers to policy initiation and implementation within their own portfolios (Laver and
Shepsle 1994). A coalition government delegates implementation of the agreed-upon poli-
cies not only to cabinet members of their own party, but also to their coalition partners
ministers (Thies 2001). Ministers in a coalition government have a particular incentive
to deviate from the agreed-upon policy positions exactly because different parties tend
to prefer different policies.
To avoid agency loss, principals (in this case, the coalition government) look to a
number of ex post control mechanisms (Strøm et al. 2010). Junior ministers may be
strategically appointed to shadow and keep tabs on the cabinet ministers of the coalition
partner (Thies 2001). Giving deputy prime ministers a coordinating responsibility and
appointing one from each coalition party serves a similar purpose (Saalfeld 2000). Inner
cabinets, specialized cabinet committees, and permanent coalition committees manage
any tensions over implementation of the agreement and unanticipated events (Müller and
Strøm 2008).
Recent studies have pointed to the importance of the legislative process as a means
to police the coalition agreement. In a seminal contribution, Martin and Vanberg (2011)
suggest that the legislative process serves as a structural solution to the keeping tabs
problem inherent to coalition government. Coalition cabinets introduce bills on which
the coalition partners agree, early in the term and postpone more controversial bills
(Martin 2004). Proposed legislation on which there is disagreement among the coalition
partners faces greater scrutiny during the legislative process (Martin and Vanberg 2004).
Pointing to the crucial role of committees in the legislative process, more contentious
proposed legislation among coalition partners is more heavily amended at the committee
stage (Martin and Vanberg 2005). Parliaments with strong committees, Martin and
Vanberg (2011) suggest, are uniquely positioned to police coalition agreements, just as
committees provide an informational advantage in legislatures more generally (Krehbiel
1991). That parties strategically assign committee chairs to keep tabs on their coalition
partners provides further evidence of the committee structures central position in intra-
coalition monitoring (Carroll and Cox 2012). André et al. (2016) argue that coalition
parties’ need to keep tabs on each other explains legislative organization, in particular,
the committee system’s structures and powers. Where multiparty government is the
norm, legislatures tend to develop strong committees. Zubek (2015) finds that reforms
expanding committee power are most likely when ideological conflict within the coalition
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government is greatest.
In summary, we know that coalition government creates unique challenges to monitor
individual ministers and police the coalition bargain. Democracies with experience of
coalition government develop rules and institutions to mitigate ministerial autonomy. We
know also that the legislative process facilitates coalition monitoring, assuming a strong
committee system. Yet committees are just one feature of legislative organization. In the
next section, we propose that other legislative instruments may serve as a mechanism for
parties in coalition government to keep tabs on each other.
2 PQs as a Coalition Policing Mechanism
A common feature of legislative organization, particularly in countries operating a par-
liamentary system of government, is the ability of members of the legislature to ask
questions of, and receive answers from, members of the government (Franklin and Nor-
ton 1993). A legislature may have dedicated question time on the floor of the chamber
during which cabinet ministers make themselves available to reply to questions posed
by legislators. Question time can be contrasted with other plenary activity, such as the
law-making process, motions, statements or general debates. In addition, legislators in
many countries are able to table written PQs. In this case, legislators submit a question
in writing and a written reply is provided by the relevant minister. Answers to both
oral and written questions may be published as part of the official record. In European
legislatures, written questions are now much more voluminous than oral questions, likely
due to the plenary bottleneck and lack of time to ask oral questions (Cox 2006; Rozenberg
and Martin 2011). The process of asking a written PQ takes the following generic format
in most democratic legislatures:
1. A parliamentarian (or a staffer with authority to act on the parliamentarians behalf)
poses in writing a question to a particular minister via the parliamentary administra-
tion.
2. The parliamentary administration reviews the question and determines whether it is
correctly formatted, follows the rules, and is directed at the appropriate minister. If al-
lowable, the question is forwarded to the relevant government department. Otherwise,
the question is returned to the member unanswered.
3. Officials within the department draft a reply, with typically either a senior official or
the minister reviewing drafts.
4. The answer to the PQ is forwarded to the parliamentary administration from where
it is communicated directly to the questioner and published in the official proceedings
of the parliament.
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PQs are acknowledged as an important tool to allow opposition parties to hold the
government to account (Russo and Wiberg 2010; Wiberg 1994). As the website of the UK
House of Commons notes, PQs are ‘used to obtain detailed information about policies
and statistics on the activities of government departments.’ A series of country-specific
studies indicate that PQs are a useful mechanism for allowing the opposition to obtain in-
formation on government behaviour and performance (for an overview, see Martin 2011b).
Wiberg (1994) suggests that the greater levels of governmental activity drive the observed
increase in PQs identified in many European legislatures. Proksch and Slapin (2011) dis-
covered that written questions in the European Parliament are an important source of
control and oversight for national opposition parties. Thus, the underlying assumption in
the study of PQs is that they serve as an important instrument of oppositional influence.3
Our core argument is that PQs are more than simply a tool for opposition influence.
PQs, we suggest, provide a potential mechanism for parties in coalition government to
keep tabs on each other’s ministers. Legislators from notional coalition party a monitor
policy implementation by ministers from notional coalition party b. When members
from the governing parties fear or detect deviation from the coalition agreement during
implementation (either in terms of proposed legislation or the executive implementation
of policy), they can table PQs to both obtain clarifying information and send a signal
to the minister. In response to such PQs, the minister corrects the policy drift. Since
we can expect that the drift in implementation is more likely in areas in which coalition
parties are more divided, we would expect more questions in such policy areas.4
How exactly do PQs mitigate agency loss in coalition politics? The key to preventing
the threat of agency loss in coalition government is to empower the principal to monitor
the agent by overcoming the informational advantage held by the agent. In other words,
the lack of information on what the agent is, or is not, doing is a key disadvantage faced
by most principals. PQs provide oversight through their ability to extract specific high-
quality information on the past, current and future actions of ministers and ministries.
Thus, in the parlance of McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), PQs provide a form of police-
patrol, allowing monitoring and reporting of information not otherwise easily available.
Written PQs reduce the informational disadvantage inherent in cabinet government by
providing the legislature a tool to find out exactly what is, or is not, going on within the
ministry. The act of asking a PQ may send a signal to the minister that the other party
or parties in the coalition are closely watching; ultimately incentivising the minister to
return to the coalition agreement.
3The assumption that PQs are exclusively a tool for opposition influence is easily debunked by the
casual observation that many PQs come from government backbenchers (in many parliaments the norm
is for government ministers not to ask PQs of each other).
4We follow the comparative coalition government literature in making the assumption that policy
differences across parties surpass policy differences within a single party. We return to the issue of
intra-party policy differences in our empirical analysis and the conclusion.
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To illustrate the potential of PQs to serve as a mechanism for governing party MPs to
keep tabs on ministers, consider the following written PQ from the House of Commons,
posed by a Liberal Democrat MP to Iain Duncan Smith, a Conservative Party cabinet
minister. The topic is welfare reform, a well-known source of tension between the two
parties (Laws 2016; Page 2015: 95):
Sarah Teather: To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions what
comparative assessment he has made of the effect on the relative health of
claimants and their dependents of changes to the jobseeker’s allowance sanc-
tion regime introduced in October 2012. [172926] (Hansard 29 October 2013:
Column 459W).
The example above illustrates well how written PQs provide a mechanism for the de-
tailed scrutiny of ministers actions and policies. Certainly, different styles of PQs exist.
Some questions may have a fundamentally local focus (for example, asking about a hos-
pital in a members constituency); some may clearly be focused on national policy (for
example, asking about the National Health Service), while other PQs may focus on more
international policies (for example, international development). Regardless of the specific
style of the PQ (Martin 2011b; Kellermann 2016) all PQs have a monitoring capacity.
Fundamentally, PQs serve to extract information from the executive, be it on the effect
of government policy on a local hospital, the health service or British overseas develop-
ment aid. PQs, and in particular written PQs, are an ideal mechanism for intra-coalition
monitoring for a number of reasons:
1. Ministers must answer a written question, typically in a timely fashion (one week in the
British case), and must provide a truthful answer. Because written PQs can request
very specific information (as the above example illustrates) and allow time for the
answer to be researched, ministers have less opportunity to say that the information
requested is not available. For example, the official United Kingdom civil service
guidance on drafting answers to parliamentary questions reminds civil servants to:
Never forget Ministers’ obligations to Parliament which are set out in the
Ministerial Code: ‘It is of paramount importance that Ministers give ac-
curate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent
error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Par-
liament will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister.
Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public,
refusing to provide information only when disclosure would not be in the
public interest.’5
5https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61195/
drafting-pq-responses.pdf
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2. Tabling a written PQ, although not resource-neutral, is nevertheless a relatively cost-
less exercise for an individual parliamentarian. It is the government who must then
expend resources to answer the question. In contrast, the use of committees as a mon-
itoring tool requires significantly more effort and resource allocation on the part of
the individual MP who must join, prepare for, attend and actively participate in com-
mittee hearings if committees are to serve as a coalition monitoring device. Members
may be reluctant to invest in committee work where the electoral rewards are limited
(Martin 2011b).
3. PQs can extract very specific information about a minister’s performance, but at a
lower political cost to the government as a whole. Because being in government can be
electorally unpopular (Narud and Valen 2008), governing parties tend to shy away from
communicating negative news and often work hard to maintain, at least the public
appearance of, government unity. Coalition oversight tools such as parliamentary
committees represent a very public way to manage tensions in the relationship. In
contrast, although PQs are publicly available, written PQs represent an arguably
more subdued way to patrol the coalition.
4. PQs allow implementation of policy and legislation to be monitored. Legislatures del-
egate the details of policy implementation to ministers who may then delegate the
task to civil servants (Huber and Shipan 2002; Strøm 2000). As Laver and Shepsle
(1994: 13) note, coalition theory has long lacked of concern for policy implementa-
tion. It seems reasonable that any attempt to police the coalition bargain should pay
attention to policy implementation. PQs can help parties explore all aspects of minis-
terial behaviour – including planned legislation, delegated legislation, through to the
operational performance of the minister and ministry.
5. Ministers and officials are often highly sensitive to the content of PQs (Martin 2011b).
As such, PQs serve as a form of two-way communication and signalling device (Schelling
1960). While the answer will provide information to the questioner, the ministry may
also take note of patterns of questions and use this as a measure of the concerns and
preferences of government backbenchers.
The suggestion is that PQs have the potential to be an intra-coalition monitoring
device. Because PQs have the advantage of being recorded in a number of legislatures, it
is possible to explore the degree to which patterns in questioning within parliaments with
coalition governments align with the allocation of ministerial portfolios between parties.
In other words, do patterns of inter-coalition PQs reflect the policy portfolios of most
conflict between parties in the coalition or, as Martin and Vanberg (2011: 79) put it,
the policy divisiveness of issues dealt with by the coalition? To explore whether PQs are
used strategically to police the coalition bargain, we explore questioning patterns among
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government MPs in the British House of Commons during the 2010-2015 coalition. The
next section introduces the British case.
3 The British Case
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy, with the cabinet responsible to the
directly elected House of Commons. Members of parliament (MPs) are elected by single
member plurality rules, resulting typically in single party majority government. The
2010 general election produced a hung parliament and following negotiations a coalition
government was formed between the centre-right Conservative Party and centrist Liberal
Democrats - the first formal coalition in post-war Britain. The coalition agreement set
out a programme of policies to be enacted by the government (Hazell and Yong 2012;
Quinn et al. 2011). Table 1 shows how cabinet portfolios were distributed between the
two coalition partners. Although an aberration in modern British politics, the coalition
government operated remarkably similarly to governments in other coalition systems,
with co-operation and unity punctuated occasionally by inter-party conflict over policies
(Laws 2016).
Table 1: Cabinet Portfolio Distribution and Gaps Between the Coalition Parties in the
2010-15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition
Portfolio/Position Party holding ministry Absolute value of gap between par-
ties (and scale used)
Mean questions per MP
Prime Minister Conservative n/a n/a
Deputy Prime Minister Liberal Democrat 1.95 (Constitutionalism) 1.2
Foreign Office Conservative 0.92 (Foreign office)* 12.8
Treasury Conservative 0.42 (State involvement in economy) 10.9
Justice Conservative 0.26 (Social-Liberal Conservative) 11.9
Home Office Conservative 2.92 (Nationalism) 14.2
Defence Conservative 3.89 (Militarism) 9.7
Business, Innovation and Skills Liberal Democrat 0.93 (Free market economy) 12.4
Work and Pensions Conservative 1.31 (Welfare state) 8.5
Energy and Climate Change Liberal Democrat 1.64 (Environmental protection) 8.1
Health Conservative 0.93 (Free market economy) 23.5
Education Conservative 0.54 (Education spending) 12.3
Communities and Local Gov-
ernment
Conservative 0.56 (Decentralisation) 9.7
Transport Conservative 0.93 (Free market economy) 13.1
Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs
Conservative 0.64 (Environment and agriculture)* 11.0
International Development Conservative 1.37 (Internationalism) 5.5
Northern Ireland Conservative 0.56 (Decentralisation) 0.9
Scotland Liberal Democrat 0.56 (Decentralisation) 0.8
Wales Conservative 0.56 (Decentralisation) 0.9
Culture, Olympics, Media and
Sport
Conservative 0.93 (Free market economy) 5.9
Note: gaps are calculated using scores created by the Lowe et al. (2011a) transformations
of MARPOR data. *Indicates a scale created by the authors using the Lowe et al. (2011a)
approach. Details of the MARPOR codes on which these new scales are based can be found in
the Supplementary Material, Table S1.
While Westminster’s committees have been strengthened in recent years, such as
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through the ability for public bill (legislative) committees to hold hearings (Kelso 2009)
and the election of select committee chairs in secret ballots of all MPs (Russell 2011), they
remain less influential than committees in many European parliaments (Martin 2011a).
At the same time, United Kingdom cabinet ministers are collectively (for the cabinet’s
decisions) and individually (for their respective portfolios) responsible to parliament. A
system of parliamentary questions is one means by which this responsibility is put into
effect (Franklin and Norton 1993). Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) is the highlight
of the parliamentary week, and one of the most important means by which the opposition
can challenge the government (Bevan and John 2016) and win political support (Bates
et al. 2014). Written questions are asked in large numbers in the UK Parliament. Scholars
have recognized the potential of PQs records to provide unique and exact insight into the
preferences and concerns of individual MPs. For example, Bird (2005) explores whether
PQs are used as a tool to represent gendered interests, Saalfeld (2011) and Saalfeld and
Bischof (2013) suggest that PQs at Westminster may be a tool to represent the interests
of visible minorities, as does Kolpinskaya (2017) with reference to religious interests.
Kellermann (2016) finds that MPs ask PQs to signal effort, rather than as a form of
constituency service (Martin 2011a).
In what follows, we assess how far PQs are used as a tool for coalition parties to
keep tabs on their coalition partners. Based on our arguments above about the potential
of PQs as a coalition monitoring tool, we expect coalition partners to target questions
strategically where the policy divergence within the coalition is greatest. Specifically,
we would expect Liberal Democrat MPs ask questions of Conservative ministers and
Conservative MPs ask questions of Liberal Democrat ministers in greater numbers on
topics where there are particularly high levels of ideological conflict between the coalition
partners.
4 Data and Analysis
To test our argument, we build and analyse a new dataset of written PQs in the British
House of Commons between the 2010 general election and the 2015 general election. This
amounts to 190,549 PQs. Table 2 shows how written PQs were distributed by political
party. The opposition Labour party asked more questions than any other party (by
almost double). The figures for the two governing parties are lower but given the high
proportions of these parties MPs involved in government at some level, this is perhaps
unsurprising.
To test our expectations, we constructed a dyadic dataset that, following the approach
used by Proksch and Slapin (2011), includes all combinations of backbenchers and gov-
ernment departments. There are 6,935 cases when restricting the data to Conservative
and Liberal Democrat MPs. Each case in the dependent variable measures the number
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Table 2: Written Parliamentary Questions by Party 2010-15
Party Written questions Questions per MP
Labour 107,795 418
Conservative 55,945 183
Liberal Democrat 10,221 179
Scottish National Party 3,881 646
Green 1,594 1,594
Plaid Cymru 1,331 444
Independents 194 194
UKIP 41 21
of written PQs asked by an MP to a particular government department. This variable
ranges from zero to 744 with a mean of 9.12 and standard deviation of 25.41.
Our independent variables measure the extent to which the two coalition parties used
written questions to keep tabs on each other. The main variable of interest is policy
divisiveness. To assess this, we need a measure of each partys position on the policy
area covered by each ministry. There are two main sources of data on party positions
that are commonly used: expert judgement data (e.g. Bakker et al. 2015) and data from
the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) project (Volkens et al.
2016). We have chosen to use MARPOR data as there are rather limited categories in
the expert judgement data, leaving us without appropriate measures for a considerable
number of departments. We employ the transformations to the MARPOR data set
out by Lowe et al. (2011a). Their approach is superior to the scales developed by the
MARPOR project for measuring party positions because they avoid problems that result
from calculating positions based on absolute proportions of sentences on each side of a
policy dimension. Lowe et al. (2011a)’s technique alleviates these problems by considering
the ratio of sentences on the ‘right’ to those on the ‘left’ of a particular policy dimension
and assessing this with a logarithmic scale in which the marginal effect of an extra sentence
declines as the number of sentences increases. Policy scales are calculated according to
the following equation (Lowe et al. 2011a: 131):
Policy scale = ln
R + 0.5
L+ 0.5
where R is the total number of sentences in the manifesto under codes on the right-wing
side of the scale and L is the equivalent figure for codes assigned to the left. Two further
advantages of this approach are that Lowe et al. (2011b) offer a wide range of policy
scales and that new policy scales can be created based on the MARPOR data, allowing
a closer fit between ministries’ policy areas and measures of position than with currently
available expert judgement data.
We measure divisiveness as zero if a question is directed to a department run by the
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MPs own party, and as the absolute value of the gap in positions between the two partners
where a question is directed at a ministry run by the other party in the coalition. Our
choices of policy scales for each department and the absolute value of gaps between the
parties on these scales are shown in Table 1. Details of the two new scales we created
are in Table S1. In our Supplementary Material we provide an explanation for our choice
of policy scale-ministry links along with robustness tests using alternative policy scales
where these are appropriate and available. Our measure of policy divisiveness allows us to
test the extent to which more PQs are asked of departments where the coalition partners
are further apart ideologically. In these cases, we would expect a greater need for parties
to keep tabs on their coalition partner.
We control for other factors that might explain levels of written questions by MPs
to particular departments. First, we take account of the salience of each department’s
policy area for the party of the MP asking the question. To operationalise this, we use
the measures of policy importance developed by Lowe et al. (2011a) based on MARPOR
data (Volkens et al. 2017).6 We expect that MPs will ask more questions on policy ar-
eas that are salient for their party as they are likely to have higher levels of interest in
these policy areas. Second, as a measure of the significance of government departments
more broadly, we use the percentage of public expenditure going to each department
(HM Treasury 2011: 27). We expect higher levels of questioning of those departments
that take up higher proportions of government spending. Third, we control for a series
of MP-level factors, one of which is a measure of Euroscepticism. Divisions over Eu-
ropean integration have long been present in the Conservative Party (e.g. Lynch 1999)
and were felt particularly strongly during the 2010-15 Parliament (Lynch and Whitaker
2013). Backbench Conservative MPs who feel their party leadership is far from their own
position on the European Union (EU) may be inclined to ask more questions of depart-
ments regardless of whether they are run by Conservative or Liberal Democrat ministers,
fearing that policy in a range of areas might be pulled away from their own preferences
as a result of legislation introduced at EU level. Some evidence of this is provided in
Table 3 which shows the individuals who asked the most questions among MPs from
the coalition parties during the 2010-15 term. Conservatives top the list, which includes
prominent Eurosceptics (Philip Davies, Priti Patel and Zac Goldsmith) as well as those
often viewed as being among the furthest right in the Conservative Party (Priti Patel,
Andrew Rosindell) and backbenchers notable for their rebellions against the party whip
6These are calculated using the same MARPOR codes as with the position measures but are trans-
formed with the following equation:
Policy importance = ln
R+ L+ 1
N
where R is the total number of sentences in the manifesto under codes on the right-wing side of the scale,
L is the equivalent figure for codes assigned to the left, and N is the total number of sentences in the
manifesto (Lowe et al. 2011a: 134).
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(Philip Davies).
Table 3: The top Ten Submitters of Written Questions among Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats, 2010-15
Name Party Number of questions asked
Andrew Rosindell Conservative 2545
Priti Patel Conservative 2172
Philip Davies Conservative 1762
David Amess Conservative 1465
Zac Goldsmith Conservative 1415
Nicholas Soames Conservative 1354
Simon Kirby Conservative 1138
Bob Russell Liberal Democrat 950
Matthew Offord Conservative 923
Adrian Sanders Liberal Democrat 883
We measure Euroscepticism with a binary variable that captures whether an MP
voted for a motion regretting the absence of legislation to provide a referendum on the
UKs membership of the EU in the Queens Speech of May 2013 (data are taken from
publicwhip.org.uk). This was a free vote and so gives a much better indication of MPs’
preferences regarding European integration than a vote controlled by the party leadership
(Hanretty et al. 2017).
MPs’ behaviour may also be affected by their sense of electoral vulnerability. Fol-
lowing Kellermann (2016) we expect that those who were elected by slimmer margins
may feel a greater need to ask PQs in order to demonstrate their parliamentary activity
to constituents. We measure each MP’s majority as the difference in percentage points
between the vote share achieved by the winner and the candidate in second place. We
expect higher levels of questioning to be associated with lower majorities.7 An MP’s
length of service in the House of Commons may also affect their questioning behaviour.
Those with more time in the House may feel less need to ask PQs in that they may feel
more secure in their positions. We measure this with time served (in years) as a member
of the House of Commons for each MP by the beginning of the 2010-15 term. On the
basis that there is some evidence of women acting differently to men in legislatures and
of different views of representational roles among women (Taylor-Robinson 2017: 252-
253), we control for whether MPs are male or female.8 We include a dummy variable
7Data on electoral majorities are taken from the British Election Study 2015 Constituency Results
Version 2.0. (DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1162.1844) and supplemented with data from Wikipedia for MPs
elected in by-elections during the 2010-15 Parliament.
8We considered controlling for whether an MP’s party has a junior minister in the department to
which their questions are addressed. Measuring this would allow us to control for an alternative coalition
monitoring mechanism (Thies 2001). We opted not to include such a measure as there is little variation
in the allocation of junior ministers. All ministries had Conservative ministers present throughout the
2010-15 Parliament and only the Northern Ireland department had no Liberal Democrat representation
at any point during the coalitions lifetime.
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for Parliamentary Private Secretaries (PPSs) in our analysis.9 The PPS position is the
bottom rung on the government ladder and is unpaid. The Ministerial Code (Cabinet
Office 2016) states that PPSs are not permitted to ask PQs of the department in which
they are based, but they may ask them of others. We expect PPSs to ask fewer questions
than other MPs due not only to restrictions placed on them by the Ministerial Code but
also on the basis that their role in government gives them a stake in the continuation of
the coalition. We also include a control for whether an MP served the full 2010-15 term
on the basis that those who were present for less time had fewer opportunities to ask
questions. Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analysis can be found in
Table S3 in the Supplementary Material.
Our dependent variable is composed of count data. The Poisson regression model,
designed for dependent variables that constitute counts, is problematic as our data are
over-dispersed, meaning that the conditional variance of the dependent variable is greater
than the conditional mean. In this situation, the appropriate approach is to use the
negative binomial regression model (Long 1997: 230), which includes an estimate of the
over-dispersion in the data (reported in Table 4). However, our dependent variable also
includes a very large number of zeros (2730 cases of a total of 6308). We take account of
this by using a zero-inflated model (Long 1997: 243), one part of which (estimated as a
logit model) allows us to specify the variables that we expect to explain whether a case
scores zero or not. For this part of the model, we include dummy variables measuring
whether MPs acted as junior ministers or cabinet ministers at some point during the 2010-
15 period. While holding these offices, MPs do not ask parliamentary questions. The
results of our zero-inflated negative binomial regression are shown in Table 4 where the
positive dispersion parameter indicates that a Poisson model would not be appropriate.
Our model shows – as expected – that as policy divisiveness increases, MPs ask
more questions. This is shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for
the policy divisiveness variable. We take this to be evidence that governing MPs are
using PQs, at least partially, to keep tabs on coalition partners. Figure 1 shows the
substantive effect of policy divisiveness on the numbers of questions asked. Moving from
0 to the maximum value of policy divisiveness on our dataset (3.89) leads to the number
of questions asked almost doubling, from 7.3 to 14.2. While this may appear modest,
if we compare it with the average number of questions asked in individual cases in our
analysis, 9.01, the change is not insubstantial. Similarly, when compared with the average
number of questions asked to each department (shown in the rightmost column of Table
1), our prediction of 14 questions for the maximum policy gap, is at or above the average
9Data on PPSs were taken from an official list published by the Govern-
ment in November 2010 and available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
government-publishes-list-of-parliamentary-private-secretaries-pps. No other reliable
data on PPSs are available for the rest of the 2010-15 term so it is possible that we have not included
some individuals who went on to hold PPS positions later in the 2010-15 Parliament.
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Table 4: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression Model of Parliamentary Questions
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Negative binomial count model
Policy divisiveness 0.17*** 0.04
Controls:
Policy importance 0.30*** 0.03
Eurosceptic 0.54*** 0.05
Female 0.09 0.06
Majority size 0.00 0.00
Time served as MP (in years) −0.01 *** 0.00
Did not serve full term −0.90 *** 0.18
Parliamentary private secretary −0.20 *** 0.07
Department percentage of public expenditure 0.04*** 0.00
Constant 2.82*** 0.09
Zero-inflation logit model
Cabinet minister 3.37*** 0.15
Junior minister 1.68*** 0.13
Constant −2.60 *** 0.12
n 6308
Dispersion parameter 2.31
Likelihood ratio χ2 test 435.12 ***
Notes: dependent variable: number of questions asked by an MP to a specific ministry,
*** p < 0.01. Alternative models using different policy scales for particular departments can
be found in the Supplementary Material, Table S4.
figure for all departments except for Health.
Our control for the importance of a ministry’s policies to the questioner’s party has
the expected positive effect and is statistically significant, demonstrating that MPs ask
more questions of departments on which their party places higher priority. Our control
for MPs’ Euroscepticism is positive and statistically significant. As we expected, Eu-
rosceptic MPs ask more questions than others. Both of these results suggest the need
for further research on intra-party questioning patterns, something we return to in the
conclusion. Our controls for female MPs and electoral majority show no statistically
reliable effects. The lack of findings for electoral marginality differs from Kellermann
(2016)’s results. We suggest this is because our dependent variable measures question-
ing to specific departments rather than simply numbers of questions asked by each MP
regardless of department, as in Kellermann (2016)s work. We find that MPs who have
served for longer time periods ask fewer questions, consistent with our expectations that
such MPs would feel less pressure to ask PQs on the basis of their more secure position in
parliament. We also find the share of public expenditure taken up by a department has
the expected effect with more questioning of departments that take up larger shares of
the budget. MPs not serving a full term ask fewer questions than others, as we expected,
and PPSs ask fewer questions than do other MPs, suggesting their position in government
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Figure 1: The effect of policy divisiveness on the number of questions asked of partner
party ministries
5
10
15
20
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
nu
m
be
r o
f q
ue
st
io
ns
 b
y 
M
P 
to
 a
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t
0 1 2 3 4
Policy divisiveness
Notes: the vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals. All other variables have been set at
their mean values except for dummy variables which have been set at their modal values.
makes them less likely to question their government colleagues. The zero-inflated logit
part of our model shows positive and statistically significant effects on the likelihood of
asking no questions of a department for those who have spent time as a junior or cabinet
minister, as we anticipated.
5 Conclusion
Coalition governments require otherwise competitive political parties to compromise on
their policy preferences, with individual ministers charged with implementing the coali-
tion compromise. The result is a classic delegation problem, with parties in coalition
government needing to keep tabs on each other to minimize agency loss. A number of ex-
post mechanisms permit parties to police the bargain, including the strategic allocation
of junior ministers and the presence of strong committees within the legislature (Martin
and Vanberg 2014; Strøm et al. 2010).
This paper aimed to contribute in two ways to the literature on legislatures and coali-
tions. First, we stress the importance of various legislative institutions as a mechanism to
police the coalition bargain. Specifically, we suggest that parliamentary questions are an-
other potential instrument for coalition parties to attempt to monitor their partners. We
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provide evidence that coalition dynamics affect questioning behaviour. Second, we high-
light the role of the British House of Commons – generally considered a weak parliament
(with weak committees) in a political system with few recent coalition governments – in
responding to the emergence of a coalition government following the 2010 general elec-
tion. Our evidence indicates that the idea of using the legislature to keep tabs on coalition
partners applies even in the case of the British House of Commons. More generally, the
suggestion is that ‘policing the bargain’ behaviour within coalition governments can exist
in ways not previously considered by scholars. Monitoring behaviour seems to take place
particularly in areas where there are relatively high levels of conflict between coalition
partners, in this case areas such as health (where the Conservatives implemented reforms,
the details of which had not been set out in their electoral manifesto), other welfare state
policies, defence and home affairs policies with implications for civil liberties.
What can we conclude from our study about the ability of the British Parliament to
enforce coalition agreements? PQs certainly provide an opportunity for coalition moni-
toring at Westminster (and, we speculate, in any legislature with a system of PQs). Of
course, our focus on PQs as a monitoring tool can be set against now conventional wisdom
in comparative legislative studies that committees are the (our emphasis) means by which
parliament can hold an executive accountable (à la Strøm 1990) and the mechanism by
which parties in coalition government can use legislatures to keep tabs on each other (à
la Martin and Vanberg 2011; André et al. 2016).
We view PQs as a complimentary good (goods which are or can be used together) to
committee systems rather than a pure substitute good (alternative goods that compete to
be used for the same purpose). Certainly, in theory PQs and committees can be substitute
goods. Our overall assessment is that PQs do provide a mechanism in the UK Parliament
for parties in coalition government to keep tabs on each other. But we do not disagree
with the notion that increasing the capacity of legislative committees would increase
the capacity of a legislature to undertake its oversight function (either on the executive
as a whole or as a form of inter-coalition monitoring). And we should not discount
the anticipatory effect of PQs – just knowing that MPs can extract information from a
particular ministry has, we suspect, a very strong anticipatory effect in keeping ministers
in line (either generally or in terms of coalition politics). The British Government may
not operate behind a glass wall – but Ministers are surely conscious that Parliament, not
least through the system of PQs – can extract information on ministerial actions and
inactions and through this hold ministers to account. Our findings thus provide further
evidence for recent research that demonstrates how backbench MPs at Westminster can
influence public policy through intra-party consultations, amendments to legislation and
committee roles (Russell and Gover 2017; Russell and Cowley 2016). This work suggests
that the UK Parliament does have mechanisms for influence which can be found by
looking beyond simplistic measures such as bill amendment success for backbenchers.
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A number of opportunities to extend the research exist. Moves beyond the research
presented here include assessing how far opposition parties target questions strategically
to emphasize or increase tensions between coalition partners. Second, we need to under-
stand the multiple functions of questions, even in a party centred electoral environment.
In candidate-centred electoral environments, parliamentary questions can be a tool for
constituency activity (Martin 2011c). Third, each parliamentary party is itself a coali-
tion of interests and preferences (Müller and Strøm 1999). From this perspective, it is
worth exploring intra-party aspects of PQs beyond our Euroscepticism measure. For
example, does belonging to a particular faction of the Conservative party predict which
Conservative MPs question which Conservative ministers? Finally, comparative, cross-
institutional, research is required to test the generalizability of our argument. PQs are a
feature of almost all national legislatures. As PQs are just one of many coalition monitor-
ing tools, we need to understand the relative popularity of these various tools to facilitate
coalition government in different political systems.
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Supplementary Material
Table S1: New additive scales created for the Foreign Office and Department for Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs
Right position Left position
Foreign Office per102 Foreign special relationships
negative + per104 Military positive
+ per109 Internationalism negative
+ per110 European Union negative
per101 Foreign special relationships
positive + per105 Military negative
+ per107 Internationalism positive
+ per108 European Union positive
Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs
per410 Economic growth positive +
per703 Agriculture and farmers pos-
itive
per501 Environmental protection +
per416 Anti-growth economy posi-
tive
Table S2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Min Max Mean Standard deviation n
Number of questions asked by MP
to specific department (dependent
variable)
0 744 9.12 25.41 6308
Policy divisiveness 0 3.89 0.36 0.69 6308
Salience of departmental policy for
questioner’s party
−7.01 −0.98 −3.02 1.12 6308
Female 0 1 0.14 0.35 6308
Eurosceptic 0 1 0.35 0.48 6308
Majority size 0.1 43.7 18.16 11.17 6308
Time served as MP (in years) 0 49.12 7.32 9.06 6308
Departmental share of public expen-
diture
0.5 27.6 5.24 6.57 6308
Did not serve full term 0 1 0.02 0.12 6308
Parliamentary Private Secretary 0 1 0.13 0.33 6308
Junior minister 0 1 0.33 0.47 6308
Cabinet minister 0 1 0.12 0.32 6308
Explanation for choice of policy scales for particular departments
and robustness tests
The Lowe et al. (2011b) measures that we employ for measuring the policy positions of
parties are derived from MARPOR Data (Volkens et al. 2016) and offer a wider choice
than scales derived from expert judgement data. We selected the most appropriate scale
given our knowledge of the responsibilities of each ministry and the legislation emerging
from each during the 2010-15 period. In most cases there was an obvious choice. Con-
stitutionalism is used for questions to the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) as this was
the policy brief taken on by the DPM (and Liberal Democrat leader) Nick Clegg. We
selected the nationalism scale for the Home Office to reflect the divisions between the
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coalition partners over how to deal with immigration and related issues. The free mar-
ket economy measure was chosen for health on the basis that the main legislation from
this department under the 2010-15 government (the Health and Social Care Act 2012)
involved changes with regard to the role of private providers in services provided by the
National Health Service. The choice of the decentralisation scale for the departments
dealing with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland reflects legislation passed under the
coalition government (e.g. the Scotland Act 2012, the Wales Act 2014) in each case that
altered the powers of legislative assemblies and executives.
For some departments our choices were restricted because (a) not all policy areas are
covered in the MARPOR coding scheme and (b) for some issues, there are codes for only
one side of a debate. Use of scales in these cases is problematic because our measure
becomes essentially one of salience, in which the measure would be based on how much of
the manifesto is dedicated to the policy area, rather than one of position, where we calcu-
late the ratio of positive to negative statements in the manifesto on the issue in question
(Lowe et al. 2011a: 131). For instance, we were unable to obtain a transport-specific
measure as the manifesto data record only positive mentions of transport and infras-
tructure. The same situation applies in the case of culture. For these two departments,
we chose the next most appropriate scale from those available, namely, the free market
economy measure, given that much legislation from these ministries was concerned with
government intervention in particular activities under these two policy areas.
In order to assess how far our results are affected by particular policy scale-department
combinations, we test the effects of employing alternative measures for those ministries
where a feasible alternative was available. Table S3 shows measures used in the main
model and, where an appropriate alternative was available, the different measures we use
in our robustness tests. Results of these tests are presented in Table S4.
As is clear from Table S4 our results remain robust to changes in measures of policy
for particular departments. We find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for
policy divisiveness in all cases. In one case (using the social-liberal conservative scale for
the Home Office) the significance level for this variable is reduced to p = 0.069.
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Table S3: Policy scales used to measure party positions for ministries and appropriate
alternatives where available
Department Lowe et al. (2011a) or new scale Alternative
Deputy Prime Minister Constitutionalism None
Foreign Office Foreign office* None
Treasury State involvement in economy None
Justice Social-Liberal Conservative None
Home Office Nationalism Social-liberal Conservative
Defence Militarism None
Business, Innovation and Skills Free market economy None
Work and Pensions Welfare state None
Energy and Climate Change Environmental protection None
Health Free market economy Welfare state
Education Education spending None
Communities and Local Govt Decentralisation Multiculturalism
Transport Free market economy None
Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs
Environment and agriculture* Standard
environmentalism measure
International Development Internationalism None
Northern Ireland Decentralisation Right-left scale (RILE)
Scotland Decentralisation RILE
Wales Decentralisation RILE
Culture, Olympics, Media and
Sport
Free market economy None
Table S4: Models of parliamentary questions using alternative measures of position and
salience for government ministries
Health Home affairs Communities EFRA NI, Scot, Wales
(welfare state) (social lib-cons) (multiculturalism) (env’lism only) (Right-left)
Negative binomial count
model
Policy divisiveness 0.17*** 0.06* 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.14***
Controls:
Policy importance 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.23***
Eurosceptic 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.55***
Female 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
Majority size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time served as MP (in years) −0.01 *** −0.01 *** −0.01 *** −0.01 *** −0.01 ***
Did not serve full term −0.90 *** −0.96 *** −0.93 *** −0.90 *** −0.90 ***
Parliamentary private
secretary
−0.20 *** −0.18 *** −0.20 *** −0.20 *** −0.21 ***
Dept % of public expenditure 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Constant 2.82*** 2.69*** 2.57*** 2.80*** 2.60
Zero-inflation logit model
Cabinet minister 3.38*** 3.36*** 3.35*** 3.37*** 3.38***
Junior minister 1.68*** 1.67*** 1.66*** 1.67*** 1.68***
Constant −2.61 *** 2.69*** 2.57*** 2.80*** 2.60
n 6308 6308 6308 6308 6308
Dispersion parameter 2.31 2.28 2.23 2.32 2.34
Likelihood ratio χ2 test 433.98 *** 484.39 *** 394.94 *** 427.23 *** 398.16 ***
Note: policy divisiveness is based on measures taken from the Lowe et al. (2011a) transforma-
tions of the 2010 MARPOR data (Volkens et al. 2016). Column headings indicate the ministry
for which an alternative measure has been tested with the name of the alternative measure
in parentheses. Abbreviations: EFRA: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; NI: Northern
Ireland.
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